Limitations upon power of General Assembly to enact private or special legislation.

SEC. 29. The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or special act or resolution relating to the establishment of courts inferior to the Superior Court; relating to the appointment of justices of the peace; relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances; changing the names of cities, towns and townships, authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing of highways, streets, or alleys; relating to ferries or bridges; relating to nonnavigable streams; relating to cemeteries; relating to the pay of jurors; erecting new townships, or changing township lines, or establishing or changing the lines of school districts; remitting fines, penalties, and forfeitures, or refunding moneys legally paid into the public treasury; regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing; extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes or otherwise relieving any collector of taxes from the due performance of his official duties or his sureties from liability; giving effect to informal wills and deeds; nor shall the General Assembly enact any such local, private or special act by the partial repeal of a general law, but the General Assembly may at any time repeal local, private, or special laws enacted by it. Any local, private or special act or resolution passed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be void. The General Assembly shall have power to pass general laws regulating matters set out in this section.

1915, c. 99. In effect Jan. 10, 1917. See Reade v. Durham, 173-668; Mills 1915, c. 393. In enect Jan. 10, 1917. See Reade v. Buthain, 173-005, Mills v. Comrs., 175-215.

Davis v. Lenoir County, 178-668; Comrs. v. Pruden, 178-394; Comrs. v. Trust Co., 178-170; Martin County v. Trust Co., 178-26; Parvin v. Comrs., 177-508; Mills v. Comrs., 175-215; Highway Com. v. Malone, 173-685; Richardson v. Comrs., 173-685; Rankin v. Gaston County, 173-683; Reade v. Durham, 173-668; Brown v. Comrs., 173-598.

## ARTICLE III

## EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Officers of the Executive Department.

Terms of office.

SECTION 1. The Executive Department shall consist of a Governor, in whom shall be vested the supreme executive power of the State, a Lieutenant-Governor, a Secretary of State, an Auditor, a Treasurer, a Superintendent of Public Instruction, and an Attorney-General, who shall be elected for a term of four years by the qualified electors of the State, at the same time and places and in the same manner as members of the General Assembly are elected. Their term of office shall commence on the first day of January next after their election, and continue until their successors are elected and qualified: Provided, that the officers first elected shall assume the duties of their office ten days after the approval of this Constitution by the Congress of the United States, and shall hold their offices four years from and after the first day of January.

Const. 1868; Convention 1835, art. II, s. 1.

Wilson v. Jordan, 124-719; Rhyne v. Lipscombe, 122-652; Caldwell v. Wilson, 121-476; Winslow v. Morton, 118-490; Battle v. McIver, 68-467; Howerton v. Tate, 68-546.